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Several years ago in Interpretation, an amicable but fierce debate played out
between Werner Dannhauser and Hilail Gildin over the alleged atheism of
Leo Strauss: Dannhauser leveled the charge of atheism, which he claimed that
Strauss concealed, or at least muted, out of “his reverence for Judaism.”1 The
evidence against Strauss is that he was a philosopher and that all philosophers
are atheists. 2 At the risk of some inconsistency, Dannhauser asked readers
1
See Hilail Gildin, “Deja Jew All Over Again: Dannhauser on Leo Strauss and Atheism,” Interpretation 25, no. 1 (1997): 125–33. Gildin was responding to an essay by Dannhauser, “Athens and
Jerusalem or Jerusalem and Athens,” in Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Critically
Revisited, ed. David Novak (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 155–71.

Strauss was publicly accused of atheism in Commentary magazine in 1959. His reply, which was
never sent, was circulated among his students and later published by Kenneth Hart Green. Like
Socrates, Strauss does not directly refute the charge of atheism; instead, he raises the question of the
meaning of the charge: “My accuser has not even tried to prove his accusation. If he should be induced
by this remark to try to prove his accusation, I warn him in advance to keep in mind the difference
between revealed theology and natural theology or to make himself familiar with it.” See Green,
Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 238.

2
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for leniency on the grounds that Strauss encouraged his students to take revelation more seriously and that as a result, many (including Dannhauser) left
Strauss’s classroom with a greater appreciation for the Bible. But why would
a philosopher encourage his students to believe revelation?
Charging philosophers with impiety and atheism is as old as philosophy
itself; however, the meaning of impiety changed dramatically in modernity
as exemplified by the life and work of Spinoza. Here, I refer not to the fact
that Spinoza himself was accused (and convicted) of not believing in the God
of the Bible, a charge for which there is compelling evidence. Rather, I mean
the modern version of the charge that Spinoza leveled against Maimonides
and medieval philosophy. Spinoza may have been the first philosopher to
use freely the accusation of impiety to defame others. In chapter 7 of the
Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza takes particular aim at Maimonides.
He reports that Maimonides “supposes that the Prophets agreed among
themselves in all things and were the highest caliber Philosophers.”3 To prove
this, according to Spinoza, Maimonides developed a simple hermeneutical
trick, namely, wherever the literal sense of scripture appears to contradict
reason, the interpreter should abandon the literal meaning in favor of a
symbolic interpretation.4 Maimonides realized, according to Spinoza, that
the nonrational multitude would never willingly submit to the authority of
philosophy, so he devised this hermeneutical strategy to conceal philosophy
and present it as theology. Maimonides’s real motive was not piety, nor even
the preservation of philosophy; rather, he was interested in power. He wished
to create a “new kind of priest,” who could establish the authoritative reading
of scripture. Maimonides’s strategy was soon adopted by other unscrupulous and ambitious men who turned the interpretation of scripture into a
violent sectarian affair. Spinoza reports that in his day, “the love of propagating divine religion [had] degenerated into sordid greed and ambition, and
likewise the temple itself into a theater where…orators were heard, none of
whom was bound by a desire for teaching the populace but for carrying them
off in admiration for himself.”5
Strauss’s verdict on the “case against Spinoza” concedes that Spinoza’s
critique of scripture, including his attack on Maimonides, is “amazingly

Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Newburyport, MA: Focus,
2004), 99.
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See ibid., 97.
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Ibid., preface, xix.
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unscrupulous.”6 By this he means that Spinoza uses scripture to undermine
the belief in scripture by refuting the Maimonidean claim that it contains
theoretical wisdom. But why did Spinoza attack Judaism and Maimonides so
ferociously? Spinoza’s broader strategy was to separate completely philosophy
and religion, and build a society that allows for freedom in both realms. Forcing scripture to abandon its claims to theoretical truth was the price for that
society, which Spinoza gladly paid in the hope that freedom would create more
stable and tolerant communities: “the humanitarian end seems to justify every
means: he plays a most dangerous game; his procedure is as much beyond
good and evil as his God.”7 By undermining scripture and promoting freedom, Spinoza may have unwittingly undermined the foundations of justice.
The success of Spinoza’s project can be attributed in large part to the stilted
account he presents of Athens and Jerusalem: if Athens represents the universally true and demonstrable account of the whole and Jerusalem stands for a
partial, superstitious account based on a particular (and therefore disputed)
revelation, it is hardly surprising for Spinoza that reason or science prevails.
With the victory of philosophy, a scholarly consensus emerged on Maimonidean political theology as a relic of the past, a misguided attempt to harmonize
philosophy and religion so that philosophy had the upper hand. By the time
Strauss wrote his first book on Spinoza’s critique of religion, few scholars—
with the notable exception of Hermann Cohen—took Maimonides seriously
as an alternative to Spinoza’s account of the theological-political problem. To
understand Strauss’s thought, Kenneth Hart Green and Jeffrey Bernstein have
written detailed accounts of how Strauss managed to recover Maimonides’s
teaching and reinvigorate the debate between Athens and Jerusalem.
According to Kenneth Green, Strauss’s Herculean effort to recover
Maimonides is among the greatest scholarly achievements of the twentieth
century. He estimates that the recovery of Maimonides is “one of four great
scholarly rediscoveries of the 20th century in Jewish Studies, on par with
[Strauss’s] friend Gershom Scholem’s recovery and presentation of Kabbalah,
with the rescue, retrieval, and editing of the treasure trove of medieval materials stored in the Genizah of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo, and with the
accidental uncovering…of the ancient Dead Sea Scrolls of the Second Temple–era Judea” (Complete Writings, xviii). Green’s scholarship has certainly
Leo Strauss, “Preface to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion,” in Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of
Modernity, ed. Kenneth Hart Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 159. Henceforth JPCM.
6
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helped to establish Strauss’s place in Jewish studies, but his latest books have
achieved something else: by collecting Strauss’s most important writings on
Maimonides, Green has made it possible for students to follow the development of Strauss’s thought and evaluate each of his discoveries.
Green is well positioned for this project, having spent his career developing a rich alternative to Spinoza’s account of the relation between Athens
and Jerusalem by examining Strauss’s thought. Green’s first book, Jew and
Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss,
presents Strauss as a “cognitive theist” rather than an atheist.8 This designation preserves Strauss’s openness to the truth of revelation which Spinoza had
attempted to foreclose in the name of reason. According to Green, Strauss
learned from Lessing that Spinoza’s rationalism had become dogmatic and
as such became the very sort of authority that philosophy rebels against. To
restore the ancient, truer meaning of philosophy, Lessing advised the use of
revelation against the dogmatism of the Enlightenment. Green shows how
Strauss, following this strategy, was able to remain loyal to Judaism and pursue philosophy. With the addition of these two volumes, Leo Strauss and the
Rediscovery of Maimonides and Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete
Writings, Green further demonstrates how Strauss learned from Maimonides
a strategy for remaining loyal to both cities without compromising the claims
of either. In other words, Maimonides presented Strauss with a compelling
alternative to Spinoza’s account of the relation between Jerusalem and Athens.
Strauss’s recovery of Maimonides, in Green’s presentation, allows simultaneously the recovery of ancient philosophy and the restoration of revelation.
In Leo Strauss on Maimonides: The Complete Writings, Green has collected
Strauss’s sixteen major essays and lectures on Maimonides, some of which
have never before appeared in English. As Green admits, however, the title of
the collection is somewhat misleading since “the aspiration to completeness
could not be achieved perfectly” (xv). This is because Strauss made so many
references to Maimonides and medieval philosophy throughout his career
that any attempt to gather all of them would require several additional volumes. Instead, Green has collected the pieces that illustrate Strauss’s gradual
rediscovery of Maimonides as a thinker of the highest caliber, who surpassed
in depth and audacity not only Strauss’s contemporaries but also Spinoza.
To appreciate the value of Green’s collection, consider Strauss’s essay
“How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed.” It appeared in 1963 as
the introductory essay to the monumental English translation of the Guide
8

Green, Jew and Philosopher, 26–27, 167n27, 237n1, 239n2.
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by Shlomo Pines. Naturally, most newcomers to Maimonides and Strauss
would see fit to begin their study with this essay. For one thing, it represents Strauss’s most extensive and complete account of how to approach the
Guide. Strauss seems to suggest as much and begins the essay by presenting
a detailed outline of the work: “I believe that it will not be amiss if I simply
present the plan of the Guide as it has become clear to me in the course of
about twenty-five years of frequently interrupted but never abandoned study”
(493). Strauss’s title should not be misconstrued. The essay is hardly intended
for novices who are just beginning their study of medieval philosophy.
Strauss’s study presumes, like the Guide itself, years of prerequisite study and
demonstrates how careful students of the Guide speak publicly about the text.
(Strauss appears to present his findings in an esoteric style: the surface of the
essay looks chaotic but is undergirded by a hidden structure.) Strauss’s essay
is so complex—Green describes it as “the most impressive effort ever made
to map the plan and structure of Maimonides’ great book”—that Green does
not even attempt to summarize it (63). Rather, he offers twelve clusters of
questions or perplexities for the reader to ponder.
If Strauss’s essay represents the peak of his lifelong study of Maimonides,
Green’s collection helps us approach this summit gradually. Strauss’s essays are
arranged chronologically so that the reader can see how he managed, step by
step, to recover Maimonides’s thought. In addition, Green has chosen several
pieces that Strauss himself did not choose to publish during his lifetime but
which show the difficulties that he encountered and how he managed to overcome them. Among the earliest pieces, Green includes unfinished notes from
a lecture in Berlin on Hermann Cohen and Maimonides. One reason Strauss
did not finish these notes is that he was still struggling to understand how
to read Maimonides. In sharp contrast, the collection also includes Strauss’s
masterful lecture nearly thirty years later in Chicago, modestly entitled “Introduction to Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.” Here we see Strauss in total
control of the content and the presentation. In less than thirty years, Strauss
learned to read the Guide and, as Green observes, “overturn several centuries
of entrenched conventional scholarly wisdom” in the process (xix).
Green explains in detail the obstacles with which Strauss contended:
scholars tended to view Maimonides as a thinker who prepared the way for
subsequent thinkers, who presumably surpassed him. From their point of
view, one may admire Maimonides’s contributions to intellectual progress,
yet also admit that the same progress has rendered his thought obsolete. One
way that modern thought has surpassed Maimonides is by separating reason
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from revelation, a prerequisite for clearing out superstition and promoting
scientific and moral progress. Our freedom, particularly from superstitions
such as the belief in revelation, is one hallmark of our progress. The alternative to this view was virtually lost until Strauss entertained the possibility
that medieval and ancient philosophy achieved a “natural perspective…[an]
enduring perception of human things as they present themselves in their
unchanged, essential manifestation” (23).
Nor did Strauss dodge the most compelling parts of Spinoza’s critique,
such as his account of the prophets as individuals who could rely only on their
imaginations because of their severely limited knowledge of nature. In his 1935
essay “Maimonides’ Doctrine of Prophecy and Its Sources,” Strauss coins the
term “prophetology” to describe the Maimonidean approach to divine law,
which resembles the Platonic approach to political science whereby prophecy
is viewed as a branch of it. Whereas Spinoza insists that reason and imagination cannot be combined in a single human being, Maimonides argues that
the best lawgiver combines both and is the most perfect human being. The
prophet, like the Platonic philosopher king, is the most perfect individual and
as such most qualified to establish the best society. The divine law combines
religion and politics to order society in the most rational way. Nor could the
best society be ordered in any other way since rationality has limited authority among the nonrational individuals who are always the majority.
To describe the divine law as the best law means that its rationality is
balanced by its ability to appeal imaginatively to nonrational individuals.
This is what Green describes as a “unique balance” between reason and revelation; the tension between them is managed in such a way as to maintain
the integrity of both (26). Maimonides “first accepts and obeys the Law,” by
whose authority he finds justification for a “life devoted to reason” (27). In
Philosophy and Law (1935), Strauss argues that modern political thought had
discredited this delicate balance such that the only compelling alternatives
appear to be “orthodoxy or atheism.” Neither alternative appealed to Strauss;
instead he sought to rediscover another possibility that could be embraced
“by rational people…and not merely as an extravagant gesture or act of will,
bespeaking despair, muddle-headedness, distress, or loss of nerve” (30). Such
a possibility entails an approach to scripture and Law that does not cut them
off from reason.
Following the thought of Maimonides led Strauss to another unexpected
discovery. In contrast to the scholarly consensus that insisted on seeing
Maimonides as a disciple of Aristotle, Strauss discovered from Farabi that
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Maimonides was instead closer to Plato: “Plato had already discovered the
principles that were vital to advance the freedom of philosophic thinking in its
theological-political context” (32). In “The Place of the Doctrine of Providence
according to Maimonides” (1937), Strauss shows how Maimonides adapts the
Platonic distinction between the few and the many to his interpretation of
the Law. His dual teaching of providence includes a general sense of providence for those who follow the Law and contribute to the collective order, and
particular providence for those who are intellectually excellent. Intellectual
virtue remains preeminent, but it does not undermine moral virtue.
As Strauss became more attentive to the demands of Platonic philosophy,
his care in reading Maimonides became even more rigorous. Reviewing a
new translation of Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah in 1939, Strauss complains
that the translator has not paid enough attention to the precision of the author
in numbering paragraphs, translating key terms consistently, and in general
assuming that Maimonides’s writing was anything but as “careful, precise,
artful, deliberate, and thoughtful as it is possible for a human author to
achieve” (43). Within two years, Strauss would publish his discovery, in “The
Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed” (1941), that the literary style
of the Guide was the key to unraveling its political teaching. Maimonides had
openly admitted to choosing every word of the Guide deliberately and carefully. Even where he appeared to contradict himself, he had assured readers,
this too was deliberate. The fact that the surface of the text appears disorganized or haphazard should not discourage us from observing the profound
depths of the book. In other words, Maimonides’s esotericism is hidden in
plain sight. Why then had it been so completely neglected by modern scholarship? The assumptions that inform that scholarship have an important
source in Spinoza’s hermeneutics, particularly chapter 7 of the Treatise, which
explains how to read the Bible. According to Spinoza, the chaotic surface of
the biblical text does not conceal any profound depth. Rather, the surface is
exactly what it appears to be, that is, a hastily compiled amalgam of sources:
“faulty, truncated, adulterated, not consistent with itself, [and] we have only
fragments of it.”9 Despite subsequent efforts to harmonize the text, there is
little point in searching for wisdom beyond the surface. Modern scholars are
trained to confirm that the Bible mostly reflects the cultural background and
prejudices of its authors, as well as a simple teaching of caritas. Spinoza has
trained us moderns to stop our interpretation at the literal surface of the text.

9

Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, 14.
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Maimonides’s account invites us to consider that, however rare it may be,
wisdom is a permanent, trans-historical possibility, and that such wisdom is
contained in revelation, including knowledge of the best human life and the
best form of political organization. Nor is scripture naive about the threats
to that life, particularly that posed by superstition. It offers the most powerful program ever conceived to limit superstitious ignorance and enlighten
humanity. Another hallmark of the wisdom of scripture is its recognition of
the limits of enlightenment and the permanent divide between the few and the
many. According to Maimonides, this wisdom is embodied in a literary style
that simultaneously addresses the different desires and needs of each group.
The apparent chaos on the surface of the Bible is actually a brilliant strategy
to address individuals of varying rationality. Such a style can be achieved
only by the most perfect individuals, the prophets, who miraculously achieve
perfection of the intellect and imagination— the very possibility that Spinoza
denies at the beginning of the Treatise.
In addition, the literary style implies a profound concern for the well-being
and the enlightenment of everyone, regardless of one’s level of rationality. The
lexicographic chapters at the beginning of the Guide indicate a basic level of
knowledge that everyone is obliged to accept lest he transgress the law by
committing idolatry. The public dimension of Maimonides’s teaching gives
way to the secret teachings of the Torah, but these secrets are concealed with
extraordinary care (see Green’s catalog of these means at Complete Writings,
47). Those who take care to penetrate the secret teaching are presumably
obliged by their wisdom above all not to divulge things that may undermine
the well-being of the others (or the stability of the society). The fact that teachings are allegedly hidden, and that those who discover them may not divulge
their discoveries, leads to endless speculation about the true meaning of the
Torah. Can we ever be certain that Maimonides means what he says? As in
a Platonic dialogue, the literary style emphasizes questions and the quest for
certainty—even more than answers. This helps explain why it is so difficult to
get to the bottom of Maimonides’s project, even with Strauss’s analysis.
Strauss had misgivings about the choice between atheism and orthodoxy
that he faced as “a young Jew born and raised in Germany.”10 Both choices
demanded commitments that Strauss was unwilling to make. The atheism
of his peers was based not on love of truth, but on a love of cruelty turned
inward, that is, a willingness to suffer as a sign of rectitude. Such a commitment could have been justified if Spinoza had been successful in giving
10

Strauss, JPCM, 137.
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a full and rational explanation of the whole. Since he was not, it was a mere
act of faith not necessarily superior to religion. To make matters worse, this
version of atheism was not moderated by reason, and tended to gravitate
toward extreme political teachings. On the other hand, Spinoza’s success in
criticizing Maimonides appeared to render the choice for orthodoxy even less
palatable, since it rested on belief in revelation that appeared to be no more
than an irrational and fantastic dream. Strauss set out to restore both Jerusalem and Athens, as Green persuasively argues, with Maimonides as his guide.
This explains why, as we saw above, Strauss’s students left his courses
with renewed respect for both reason and revelation. But Green’s account,
while persuasive, also raises some troubling questions. The defense of Maimonides involves showing the possibility, contra Spinoza, that scripture
contains theoretical wisdom. But apart from his posthumously published
lecture “On the Interpretation of Genesis,” Strauss makes relatively little
effort to do so.11 In addition, Green’s collection reveals that Strauss did most
of his work on Maimonides in the thirties. After 1941, there are relatively
few studies devoted exclusively to Maimonides. There is, to be sure, the
important effort Strauss made to have the Guide translated into English in
1963—an effort that leaves no doubt about his reverence for Maimonides.
But Strauss’s prodigious scholarly output is primarily devoted to Athens. One
might wonder whether Strauss turned from Maimonides to Plato as a result
of his “rediscovery” of Maimonides. Or, as Spinoza suggests, whether respect
for Jerusalem merely conceals an attempt to establish the authority of Athens.
Green insists otherwise:
Strauss expresses his conviction that, however much Maimonides
made use of Greek philosophy, what he presents as his definitive
teaching is affirmatively Jewish. This is not merely Greek philosophy
with a Jewish veneer, but is an attempt to wrestle with the challenge of
ancient Greek thought, and with what the best Greek thinkers taught
about God, man, and the world in order to, if possible, make it consistent with Jewish teachings. (61)

Green’s two volumes establish the importance of Strauss’s rediscovery of
Maimonides and, more generally, the need to study medieval rationalism
in order to grasp the limits of modern rationalism. At the same time, and

11
Leo Strauss, “On the Interpretation of Genesis,” in JPCM, 359–76. Also see Leo Strauss, “Jerusalem
and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections,” in JPCM, 377–405.
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to Green’s great credit, his collection and commentary do not suppress the
central questions about the relation of Athens and Jerusalem.12
Indeed, Green has pursued theoretical alternatives openly and vigorously as the director of the SUNY Press series The Thought and Legacy
of Leo Strauss, inviting a range of serious contributions from scholars of
Strauss’s thought. The most recent addition to this series is Jeffrey Bernstein’s
Leo Strauss: On the Borders of Judaism, Philosophy, and History. Like Green,
Bernstein affirms the centrality of Maimonides for understanding Strauss
(51, 162–63). He also argues that Maimonides made it possible for Strauss
to recover both Jerusalem and Athens and this recovery makes him a most
original and important critic of modern Jewish thought (see 34). In addition,
Bernstein’s account supplements and extends Green’s analysis. For example,
in an original and penetrating reading of What Is Political Philosophy?, Bernstein shows that Strauss deliberately avoided mentioning Maimonides during
his lectures at the Hebrew University in 1953 in order not to upset his audience (130). This helps demonstrate that Maimonides plays a central role in
grasping the meaning of Strauss’s mature thought, even when he is hidden
from view (127).
But Bernstein’s account of Maimonides and his relation to Spinoza
diverges from Green’s in interesting ways. Taking as his starting point
Strauss’s correspondence in the thirties, Bernstein argues that Maimonides
represents for Strauss a philosopher “who is theoretically uncompromising
in his advocacy of philosophy and who also wrote exoterically in order not
to upset the community in which he lived” (xxvii). Maimonides recovered
Platonic political philosophy and moved into Athens, where Strauss found
him and also took up residence (47–48): Maimonides “was a citizen of Athens donning the outfit of Jerusalem” (131). Strauss too, following Machiavelli,
conceals his blasphemy and thereby “compels the reader to think the blas-

Green has rightly pointed out in a recent interview that it would be foolish to interrogate Strauss to
discover his view of Jerusalem: “If some people might be inclined to set up a Jewish inquisition, and
suspect every Jewish thinker or even every Jewish person, and to examine or interrogate them for how
much, or how precisely, they believed in every article of the faith as defined by Maimonides, I can’t
vouch for what the exact result would have been in the case of Leo Strauss. But I also don’t think that
this is a very Jewish thing to do. Rather, we should judge Strauss by his actions; and in terms of these,
we would see that he was a profoundly loyal Jew during his entire life” (https://kavvanah.wordpress.
com/2013/07/18/why-maimonides-matters-kenneth-hart-green-part-i/). But, while relentless inquiry
and theoretical boldness are unseemly for a citizen of Jerusalem, do such traits not characterize (leaving aside the violence) the spirit of inquiry in Athens?

12
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phemy by himself and thus to become [his] accomplice.”13 Bernstein makes
an even bolder argument in chapter 5, where he suggests that according to
Strauss, both Spinoza and Maimonides shared the same “compulsion” for the
truth, “be it construed as Platonic eros…or Spinozan conatus” (150). In this
reading of Persecution and the Art of Writing, the “differences between the
two…appear to be historical rather than philosophical. Differently stated, the
divergence between the two thinkers concerns their modes of presentation
more than the content of their thought” (153).
As for the differences between Spinoza and Maimonides, Bernstein
argues that they are more apparent than real. Spinoza’s radical critique of
religion, for example, was not original; rather it had been rediscovered by
Machiavelli who in turn had learned it from medieval and pagan philosophy (127). In fact, it had been well known to Maimonides, who chose to
conceal it from all except his more careful readers. Strauss says that Maimonides “brought the greatest sacrifice” by defending the Torah against the
philosophers. Bernstein interprets this sacrifice to be Maimonides’s political and religious accommodation of his philosophic thought to the Jewish
people, even though he affirmed the superiority of intellectual to moral virtue (129–32). From this point of view, the conflict between Jerusalem and
Athens appears to be a version of the tension between the imagination and
reason, which Spinoza describes as the problem of superstition. The fact that
each presents a different solution to the conflict represents the historical or
accidental circumstances in which each thinker found himself: “In another
age, or even in another country, Spinoza would have been compelled by his
principle of caution to make entirely different proposals for the protection of
philosophy, without changing in the least his philosophical thought.”14
Had Bernstein merely portrayed Strauss as an advocate of Athens, his
account would have been nearly identical to Heinrich Meier’s presentation
of Strauss “as a political philosopher who never wavers from his attempts to
disprove revelation” (137).15 Instead, Bernstein devotes much of his analysis
This is Strauss’s description of Machiavelli, but Bernstein uses it to describe Strauss’s treatment of
Maimonides (see 127–28).

13

14
Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 192,
quoted in Bernstein, 153.
15
In chapter 5, Bernstein distinguishes his position from Meier’s presentation of Strauss as a modern atheist political philosopher in Leo Strauss and the Theological-Political Problem (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006). According to Bernstein, Meier’s presentation claims that Strauss
does not take revelation seriously as an alternative to philosophy, but rather “holds that philosophy
needs the existence of revelation only insofar as that existence allows philosophers to better see the
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to Strauss’s preoccupation with Judaism, particularly his efforts to rescue
modern Jewish thought from its devotion to historicism and the belief in
progress. One of the most fascinating sections of Bernstein’s argument is
his chapter “Strauss’s Maimonides,” which shows both Strauss’s debt to his
fellow scholars of Jewish thought and his radical rejection of their work.
Bernstein also shows how Strauss’s stay at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1954–55 culminated in his attempt to address the meaning of Zionism
without undermining the modern Jewish state. In short, according to Bernstein, Strauss may not have been a believer, but he was certainly devoted to
the study of Jewish thought (83, 23, 34). This paradox, that Strauss remained
devoted to Judaism without being a believer, rests at the heart of Bernstein’s
inquiry. How did Strauss manage to reconcile the love of one’s own with the
love of the good?
Fittingly, Bernstein crafts his answer from Strauss’s own remarks explaining that the prophets and Socrates do not live in the center of the city, but at
the periphery: “The man who loves perfection and justice must leave the cities
inhabited exclusively by the wicked, to search for a city inhabited by good
men, and he must prefer, if he does not know of such a city or if he is prevented from bringing one about, wandering in the desert or in caverns to the
association with evil men.”16 According to Bernstein, Strauss chose to live “on
the border” so that he could seek the good in full view of other alternatives.
Some borders are more lasting and comprehensive than others. National borders, for example, are not as comprehensive as the border between reason and
revelation, a border upon which the West itself was founded. Even though
Strauss settled in Athens, he lived on the border where he had a full view of
Jerusalem, where the attraction of revelation was perpetually in view. As a
result, Strauss was able to resist dogmatism and sectarianism; in fact, this
appears to be the precondition for philosophy, one shared by Maimonides,
Spinoza, and Strauss.
To live on the border, for Bernstein, means to take seriously the tension
between reason and revelation, and the centrality of this tension is easy to
identify in the work of Maimonides and Strauss. The case of Spinoza is more
challenging because the “chief purpose” of his Theologico-Political Treatise is

alternative to the philosophical way of life; in seeing this alternative, philosophers better understand
their own way of life” (137).
Leo Strauss, “Some Remarks on the Political Science of Maimonides and Farabi,” in Complete Writings, ed. Green, 305; quoted in Bernstein, 13 (cf. 85).

16

Book Review: Three Works on Leo Strauss

127

to redraw the borders.17 On this new map, revelation surrenders to reason all
claims to the truth. Spinoza’s residence may still be located on the outskirts,
but the map seems to have changed dramatically. Furthermore, according
to Strauss, Spinoza lived in temporary housing while he built a new city and
a new church. The foundation for this city was a new conception of God.
Spinoza “showed the way toward a new religion or religiousness which was
to inspire a wholly new kind of society, a new kind of Church. He became
the sole father of that new Church which was to be universal in fact.”18 Bernstein admits that it appears “Spinoza’s thought is the precise rejection of
Maimonides’s thought,” but in fact remains closely attached to Maimonidean thought in maintaining the superiority of the theoretical life over the
practical life (136). This philosopher does not move his residence, even if his
neighbors—the particular form of superstition—move. Spinoza’s claim that
Maimonides wished to create “a new form of ecclesiastical authority,” namely
reason, turns out to apply equally well to Spinoza himself.
One might wonder whether Spinoza, in redrawing the borders and
founding a new church, has managed to resist the temptation to dogma or,
in other words, whether the revolt of philosophy initiated by Machiavelli
remains located in Athens. Such questions and many others raised in these
stimulating and important volumes are well worth pondering as we decide,
as Strauss urges us to do, which city to live in: “No one can be both a philosopher and a theologian, or, for that matter, some possibility which transcends
the conflict between philosophy and theology, or pretends to be a synthesis
of both. But every one of us can be and ought to be either one or the other,
the philosopher open to the challenge of theology, or the theologian open to
the challenge of philosophy.”19 Bernstein and Green have done a great service
for students seeking residence in either Jerusalem or Athens by clarifying the
fundamental issues that separate them.
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Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, chap. 14.
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19

Strauss, JPCM, 116.
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